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OF THE MATRIMONIAL

CASES

brought to trial

at the Archdiocesan Tribunal in New York involve the question
of lack of due discretion on the part of one or both parties at the time
of the marriage contract. Most of these cases are concerned with the
possibility of mental illness on the part of one of the contractants at
the time of marriage.
What must be established in such cases is the existence of a mental
illness which impaired cognition or will to the extent that the person
was unable to give valid matrimonial consent. It is not sufficient to
establish the existence of a grave mental disorder before or after the
ceremony; it must be clearly demonstrated that the illness was present
precisely at the time of the contract. This requirement is based on the
idea that even in the most severe mental disorders which occur without
a primary disturbance of brain function, there can be so-called "lucid"
periods in which a person's cognition and will are sufficiently intact for
him to enter a valid contract of marriage.
The psychiatric consultant, or expert, is an agent of the court whose
duties are: (1) to examine the entire record of the case, including the
medical records and testimony of both medical and non-medical witnesses; and (2) to submit a written report of his findings and then
testify under oath before the court. On some occasions the psychiatric
expert has the opportunity to examine the allegedly incompetent party
but, except in cases where diagnostic differences exist among previous
examiners, such examinations may prove of little value to the court in
arriving at its decision. It should be remembered that ordinarily the
psychiatric expert is appointed long after the marriage was contracted.
Undoubtedly, the most valuable evidence in cases of this sort are
medical records-usually, but not always, from a hospital-which have
existed prior to the marriage. The testimony of individual psychiatrists
who have seen either party subsequent to the marriage will, in general,
be somewhat less impressive to the court. In any case, the medical
* Medical expert for the Tribunal of the Archdiocese of New York.
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records become infinitely more valuable
if they are more than mere statements of
diagnostic findings but rather include
specifics to document the diagnosis:
statements and behavior of the patient,
specific responses on psychological testing, etc. Medical records often give a
rather complete history of the life of the
patient. Obviously, this can be extremely
helpful in reaching a conclusion about
the diagnosis at the time of marriage.
This history has added value since it has
not been obtained in relation to the annulment procedure itself.
To many psychiatrists, the Church
court's attitude seems rigid, unyielding,
and out of keeping with our knowledge of
the extent to which unconscious and preconscious forces can determine behavior.
A similar fundamental disagreement exists
in the area of the responsibility of the
criminal under current civil law. Changes
seem to be occurring in the interpretation
of canon law as well as civil law, and
mention will be made later of changes
which seem possible in the future.
We may, for purposes of this discussion, divide mental disorders into three
large categories: psychoses, psychoneuroses, and personality disorders. A psychotic disorder may be defined as one in
which the personality, in its struggle for
adjustment to internal and external
stresses, utilizes extreme emotional states
(like mania and melancholia), withdrawal from reality, so-called "autistic" thinking (as distinguished from "realistic"
thinking) and/or the formation of delusions or hallucinations. The psychotic
disorders include: (1) the schizophrenic
reactions, by far the most common psychoses; (2) the manic-depressive reac-
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tions, which are considerably less common; and (3) the paranoid reactions, the
least common.
The schizophrenic reactions are characterized by withdrawal from reality,
bizarre and unrealistic thought processes,
blunted and grossly inappropriate emotions and emotional responses which are
frequently inconsistent with the apparent
thoughts of the person. It is important to
emphasize here that schizophrenic disorders very frequently exist without apparent delusions and hallucinations, and that
these disorders are not necessarily any
less incapacitating because delusions and
hallucinations are absent. At the present
time, it is widely recognized that almost
all schizophrenic disorders are essentially
lifelong, in the sense that they have their
beginnings in the very earliest years of
life but often do not become strikingly
apparent until the adolescent and adult
period when the ego is called upon to deal
independently with reality and with the
internal demands for sexual and emotional intimacy with other human beings. The
schizophrenic's impoverished sense of self
and his basic mistrust of himself and of
everyone else-these, rather than grossly
delusional thinking or hallucinations-are
the things which render him incapable of
mature living and true marriage. These
cases at present constitute the bulk of
those in which annulments are granted
for psychiatric reasons, but even in these
cases we are frequently hard put, in the
absence of conspicuous signs such as delusions and hallucinations, to convince
the courts involved of the person's incapacity. It should be added, however,
that if the existence of a schizophrenic
reaction prior to marriage can be estab-
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lished, so-called "lucid" periods are not
presumed and would indeed be extremely
difficult to prove to a court.
The manic-depressive reactions are psychoses characterized by severe mood
swings, extreme elation (euphoria) or
profound depression, or an alternation of
both. Disturbance of thinking is not usually a conspicuous feature of this disorder,
except to the extent that the patient has no
insight into the unreality or absurdity of
his emotional response. As I said before,
such cases are much less frequent than the
schizophrenias and, I might add, are somewhat more treatable. Because of the
cyclical nature of this disorder, it can be
much more difficult to prove that the
psychosis was in existence at the time of
marriage.
The paranoid reactions, least common
of all, are characterized by delusions of a
grandiose or persecutory nature, ordinarily
without hallucinations, and, unlike schizophrenia, the emotional response and behavior are consistent with the ideas held.
This diagnosis is rarely made at the
present time, and the likelihood of its
occurring in connection with marriage
cases is so slight that we may safely ignore
it.
The psychoneurotic disorders, since they
do not present gross disorganization of the
personality and do not exhibit gross distortion or falsification of external reality,
are for all practical purposes never considered grounds for annulment proceedings. Afflicted with a psychoneurosis, the
person suffers from anxiety or from a variety of symptoms which defend him against
anxiety, but he is well aware of the unreasonableness or the irrationality of his
emotional state.

Psychic impotence, which is sometimes
grounds for annulment, may be symptomatic of a neurosis or of a more severe
pathological state.
Another group of emotional disorders,
which are the most difficult to deal with
in or out of court, are the so-called personality disorders. These disorders are
characterized by development defects or
pathological trends in the structure of the
personality, with minimal subjective anxiety and little or no sense of distress. In
most instances, the disorder is manifested
by a lifelong pattern of action or behavior rather than by emotional symptoms.
These people are difficult to live with and
difficult to treat. Furthermore, despite
their often conspicuous emotional incapacity for mature living, it is most difficult
at present to convince courts of their incapacity for contracting a valid marriage.
The types of personality disorders that
we encounter in marriage cases include
the so-called sociopathic personalities.
Symptomatic of these disorders are: (I)
antisocial reaction; (2) dyssocial reaction;
(3) sexual deviation; and (4) addiction
(alcoholism and drug addiction).
In sociopathy we are dealing with individuals whose behavior is chronically
deviant from what our society defines as
acceptable. In the cases of addiction and
sexual deviation, the aberrant behavior is
essentially confined to one area (although
frequently, through absurd laws or absurd
law enforcement, both the addict and the
sexual deviate are pushed into other kinds
of antisocial behavior).
In the antisocial or dyssocial personality
there is a much wider range of transgression-to such an extent that the person
can appear to be totally unrelated to so-
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ciety or totally at war with it. In psychoanalytic terminology, these people have
developed little or no super-ego (roughly
equivalent to conscience).
The difficulty-at present we might say
the relative impossibility-of obtaining an
annulment on the grounds of a pre-existing personality disorder results from the
lack of gross disturbance of verbalization
or thinking, and this despite the fact that
a personality disorder can be much more
disturbing to a marriage than many cases
of schizophrenia. The homosexual husband
or the chronically antisocial husband can
frequently disrupt and destroy a marital
relationship more quickly than a psychotic
husband.
This brings me to my concluding remarks. There must be a rethinking of the
whole problem of the psychiatric grounds
for annulment, perhaps roughly paralleling
the rethinking that is being done in the
civil area in regard to emotional disorders
and responsibility in criminal cases.
The central issue is: What is it that
incapacitates an individual from contracting a valid marriage? It is certain that
it is not simply the absence of or the loss
of reason. We might point out that the
canonical age for marriage is a good many
years beyond the so-called age of reason.
Therefore, it seems to be assumed that
the simple possession of the rational faculty is not in itself sufficient to render a
person capable of valid marriage. Is there
here an implied recognition that there
must be a certain level of maturation of
the personality, beyond the mere possession of the power of thinking logically, in
order for a valid marriage to occur? I
think there is. I have stated before that
many psychiatrists would consider the
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current attitude of most Church courts
too narrow and too rigid. I refer, of course,
to the tendency to annul only where
there is very clear evidence of a grossly
psychotic condition before or at the time
of marriage. Surely it is not only the
grossly psychotic individual who is incapable of fulfilling the terms of the marriage
contract. The homosexual, the antisocial
personality, the schizophrenic who is not
delusional or hallucinated-all of these
may be likewise incapable. Even beyond
these categories, there may be individuals
whose lack of recognition or control of
certain emotional reactions in themselves
renders them incapable of a mature and
satisfying marriage and parenthood.
All of this suggests very strongly that
there must be far more clarification and
definition of what a person must be and
possess in order to contract a valid marriage. This clarification and definition can
occur with the aid of our growing psychiatric knowledge and, also, with a greater
knowledge on the part of psychiatrists of
canonical thinking.
I hope there will be changes in the
future; for example, that the personality
disorders mentioned will, in some cases,
be found to be sufficient grounds for invalidity. Most of the changes may have
to come through the slow evolution of
processing individual cases in court, although it is not inconceivable that some
sort of joint commission of canon lawyers
and psychiatrists might be able to evolve
a new or more clearly defined and stated
law. In any case, change will come as
psychiatrists are better informed about
the thinking of the courts and, concurrently, as the courts become better informed
about current psychiatric thought.

